

**DE GRUYTER
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Peter Bogason

NATO AND THE BALTIC APPROACHES 1949–1989

WHEN PERCEPTION WAS REALITY



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Foreword

The defence of the Baltic Approaches during the Cold War is a large theme, and I have not attempted to include everything. My main focus concerns the two navies which in my opinion had the core roles, but I have not forgotten that defending that area is a task across the traditional three military forces. So army and air force are included, but mainly in a skeleton version.

I have had great help from the national archives, but reader be warned: there is a huge NATO archive which is still classified, and the message from NATO is that declassifying papers will take years, and finding them takes years before such declassification. Therefore, the BALTAP archives are not included in my research. So the narratives in the book are mainly based on declassified documents in national archives and those papers NATO has already declassified and made accessible on the internet.

I have also used a quite large part of the existing literature, but preferably so that my archival sources add to the knowledge from that literature which therefore is not repeated in depth. With a few exceptions I have refrained from initiating a who-is-right discussion.

The NATO organisation uses a deluge of abbreviations for organisations, commanders and various activities, and the most common ones are used here, too. A list of abbreviations located after this foreword will help the reader who is not familiar with that terminology.

During the Cold War there were two countries called Germany – East and West. I use the word Germany and Germans for West Germany; if East is meant, it is spelled out. I also use miles frequently, meaning nautical miles (1852 meters).

Geographical names have mostly been spelled in the native language.

No book is created by one person alone, at least not when I am the author. I have been heavily dependent on access to archives in Copenhagen, Freiburg and Mons, three institutions whose personnel have been very helpful along the way. The Royal Danish Defence College provided me with a security clearance that led the way to certain classified documents. The Zentrum für Militärgeschichte und Sozialwissenschaften der Bundeswehr in Berlin gave me access to office space in the Freiburg Archive. I thank all of the above institutions.

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Copenhagen August 2023
Peter Bogason

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Abbreviations

2. ATAF	2nd Allied Tactical Air Force
AA	Anti-Aircraft (guns/missiles)
AFNORTH	Allied Forces Northern Europe
AFCENT	Allied Forces Central Europe
AMF	Allied Command Mobile Force
ASW	Anti Submarine Warfare
ASP	Atomic Strike Plan
BALTAP	Allied Forces Baltic Approaches
CINCLANT	Chief Atlantic Forces
CINCNORTH	Chief Allied Forces North
CINCENT	Chief Allied Forces Centre
COMTAFDEN	Commander, Tactical Air Force, Denmark
DC	Defence Committee (NATO)
D-day	Day of initiation of hostilities (+ yy indicates D-day plus yy days)
EDC	European Defence Community
ECM	Electronic Counter Measures
FOD	Flag Officer Denmark
FOG	Flag Officer Germany
FPB	Fast Patrol Boat
FSS	Forsvarsstyrelsen – The Danish Joint Chiefs of Staff
GIUK	gap – waters between Greenland, Iceland and the UK
GTB	Gas Turbine Boat
Helo	Helicopter
HQ	Head Quarter
IFF	Identify Friend and Foe
LOC	Line of communication – transport corridor
MC	Military Council (of NATO)
Miles –	always nautical miles, 1.852 km.
MTB	Motor Torpedo Boat
M-day	Day of Mobilisation (+ yy indicates M-day plus yy days)
NAVNORTH	Naval Command AFNORTH
NCS	Naval control of Shipping
POL	Petroleum, oil and lubricants
Recce	Reconnaissance
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SACLANT	Supreme Commander Atlantic
SAR	Sea-air-rescue operations
SG	NATO's Standing Group
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
STANAVFORLANT	Standing Naval Force Atlantic
TCC	Temporary Council Committee

XVI — Abbreviations

UKMF	United Kingdom Mobile Force
WAPA	Warsaw Pact
WEU	West European Union
WWI	World War I
WWII	World War II